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Abstract: The study adds to crime-drop research examining the security hypothesis. It
provides evidence that effective security was introduced for some high-risk vehicles from
the mid-1980s in England and Wales and causally connects this to a gradual change
in the vehicle-related theft rate. Following three decades of exponential increase to 1987,
the rate of increase slowed and continued to decelerate to a 1993 peak. Thereafter the
rate fell slowly at first then rapidly from 1995. It is concluded that: (i) what became
the change in the rate of vehicle-related theft began in the 1980s, which is earlier than
typically understood; and (ii) the gradual arc of the theft rate over more than a decade is
consistent with new security gradually permeating the vehicle fleet.
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The term ‘international crime drop’ (Tseloni et al. 2010; Knepper 2012;
van Dijk, Tseloni and Farrell 2012; Farrell, Tilley and Tseloni 2014; Tonry
2014) denotes the breadth of crime’s decline in recent decades. A broad
set of acquisitive crimes fell in England and Wales from 1992 and personal
crimes from 1995. Burglary and theft had been falling in the United States
from the early 1980s, then car theft and violence from 1991. National
victim surveys in France and the Netherlands show crime drops from the
mid-1990s, and to the extent that it can be reliably determined, the story
is similar across Europe, North America, the antipodes and elsewhere.
Improved vehicle security, particularly electronic immobilisers and cen-
tral deadlocking, has been causally linked to the decline in vehicle theft in
Australia, England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and the United
States (Bӓssmann 2011; Brown and Thomas 2003; Brown 2004, 2013;
Farrell et al. 2011a; Farrell, Tseloni and Tilley 2011b; Fujita and Max-
field 2012; Kriven and Ziersch 2007; Potter and Thomas 2001; van Ours
and Vollaard 2015). This evidence supports the security hypothesis which
posits that crime fell due to improved security of different types with little
1
C© 2016 The Authors. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice published by John Wiley &
Sons Ltd. and The Howard League
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The Howard Journal Vol 00 No 0. xxxx 2016
ISSN 2059-1101, pp. 1–12
TABLE 1
Data Signatures Consistent with Security having Reduced Vehicle-related Theft
 The timing and spread of security fits with the trajectory of declines in
vehicle-related theft in different countries
 Different security devices impact differently against different crime types, consistent
with their preventive mechanisms
 Preventive effects are much stronger effects when multiple security devices are in
place
 The average age of stolen vehicles increased over time when crime fell, because new
vehicles have better security
 There were quicker and larger effects on temporary theft (joyriding, transportation)
than on permanent theft (for resale or chopping)
 Offenders’ modus operandi changed, with door lock forcing declining
disproportionately, consistent with better quality deadlocks.
 Vehicle theft fell somewhat more quickly among higher income groups, consistent
with the more rapid replacement of older insecure vehicles
 The rate of attempted theft fell later than completed theft, consistent with offenders
trying again before quitting in the face of improved security
 There was a disproportionate decline in adolescent crime, consistent with novices
being more easily deterred by improved security
 In Australia and Canada, car theft fell earlier in regions that introduced electronic
immobilisers earlier, then fell nationally in line with their broader spread
or no resulting crime displacement (Farrell et al. 2011a; Farrell, Tilley and
Tseloni 2014). The only study we know of, to date, that asked offenders why
crime had declined, found security to be their most popular explanation
(Brown 2015).
While vehicle-related theft is the present focus, the research on that
crime type is given indirect support by mounting evidence that improve-
ments to household security devices – particularly improved window and
door locks and fittings plus security lighting – caused the decline in house-
hold burglary in England and Wales. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the analytic
data signatures that have been identified in security hypothesis research to
date on vehicle theft and household burglary in studies cited above, plus
those of Grove, Tseloni and Tilley (2012), Farrell (2015), Tilley, Tseloni
and Farell (2011), Tilley, Farrell and Clarke (2015a), and Tilley et al.
(2015b).
Most other explanations for why crime declined have largely fallen by
the wayside. The review by Farrell, Tilley and Tseloni (2014) finds that 16
hypotheses present in the academic literature cannot be considered viable.
The more prominent among them were the suggestions that crime fell due
to aspects of policing, imprisonment, abortion legalisation, childhood lead
poisoning, or demographic change. Many of the early hypotheses such
as abortion (plus gun control, the death penalty, immigration) were only
ever really applicable to the United States, and as well as being largely
discounted there, they are parochial in the international context. Most
others are inconsistent over a range of other evidence (Farrell 2013). For
instance, the data signatures listed in Tables 1 and 2 appear irreconcilable
with all except the security hypothesis (Farrell, Tilley and Tseloni in press).
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TABLE 2
Data Signatures Consistent with Security having Reduced Domestic Burglary
 A steep decline in households without security coincided with burglary’s decline
 Variation in the effectiveness of different security devices are consistent with their
preventive mechanisms
 Preventive effects are much stronger effects when multiple security devices are in
place
 The drop was mainly a decline in forced entry through doors and windows,
consistent with improved security
 Unforced entries – push-pasts, keys used, deception – increased when forced entries
(and all burglary) decreased, consistent with partial short-term displacement as a
result of effective security
 Door-forcing at the rear of properties fell first and fastest, consistent with security at
the previously most vulnerable entry point
 There was a disproportionate decline in adolescent crime, consistent with novices
being more easily deterred by improved security
 The rate of attempted burglary fell later than completed burglary, consistent with
offenders trying again before quitting in the face of improved security
 Burglary fell slightly faster among more affluent households, consistent with more
rapid upgrading
There remains much research to be undertaken relating to the security
hypothesis. In particular there is a need to more fully explain declines in
violence. Both direct and indirect ways in which security reduced violence
have been hypothesised and preliminary evidence and argumentmustered
(see, for example, Farrell, Laycock and Tilley 2015). The present study,
however, offers a refinement to the understanding of the relationship be-
tween the timing and spread of improved vehicle security and its effect
upon vehicle-related theft.
The problem addressed herein is as follows. Previous research assumed
that improved security was introduced around the time of the 1993 peak
in vehicle theft and thereby caused the subsequent decline in theft rates.
However, there is a discrepancy between this assumption and theory. In
theory, it would not be expected that improved security on new vehicles
would have a widespread immediate impact. New vehicles on the road
are, each year, only a small proportion of total vehicles. Laycock (2004)
estimated that: ‘[i]n England and Wales it takes about ten years for the
majority of the fleet to be replaced with new vehicles’ (p.37). This means
that if improved security was introduced only to new vehicles in 1993, its
main impact would not be observed until several years later.
The present study first offers evidence that improved vehicle security
was introduced in England and Wales in the mid-1980s. It then examines
the trend in vehicle theft to show that a gradual and prolonged change
occurred from the 1980s that is consistent with the theory of how security
would spread through the vehicle fleet.
Vehicle Security in the 1980s
In 1985, then Minister of State for the Home Office, Giles Shaw, observed
that:
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It is encouraging that a number of British manufacturers are already beginning to
respond by introducing for example high security locks on car doors and steering
columns. (Shaw 1985, p.iii)
This statement was part of the Foreword to Southall and Ekblom’s (1985)
landmark study of designing out vehicle crime. Its significance here is
that it formally documents that manufacturers were already introducing
improved vehicle security by 1985. Its identification of specifically British
manufacturers implies that they were ahead of those elsewhere, which fits
with vehicle-related crime rates falling earlier in the UK than in some other
European countries.
Vehicle security was far from a new idea of course. Perry (1910) notes
a range of after-market security devices to prevent vehicle theft. Keys
and licence plates are now so seemingly mundane that their origin as
security devices is easy to overlook (see Newman (2004) for a history). In
England and Wales there was pressure upon car manufacturers from the
HomeOffice from at least the 1960s, with steering column locks negotiated
for all new vehicles from January 1971 (Mayhew et al. 1976, p.9). This
was influenced by how ‘in the German Federal Republic the requirement
that all cars on the road be fitted with steering column locks produced
a substantial reduction in theft of vehicles’ (Mayhew 1979, p.26, italics
in original). Many subsequent security developments were anticipated by
Ekblom’s (1979) prescient notions of a crime-free car, while insurance-
based incentives that are now routine were still comparatively rare (Pease
1979).
Although security was beginning to be introduced from the mid-1980s,
by the start of the 1990s there were still many vehicle models that were
easy to enter and steal. One Home Office study, in which adolescent car
thieves were interviewed, concluded that:
The tool that was usually carried was a screwdriver, which was used to open a car
door by inserting it into the car lock and twisting . . . ‘Quicker than a key’ according
to one of the offenders, aged 17 . . . Fords andVauxhalls weremost popular because
they were ‘easier to get into and get away’ . . . All stated that they were not just after
any car, but sporty fast cars. (Spencer 1992, p.15)
While a more extensive study concluded that for many models:
Vehicle security is seen as lamentably weak, offenders having little or no trouble in
overcoming door and ignition locks. (Light, Nee and Ingham 1993, p.53)
In the early 1990s when those interviews were conducted, the rate of
vehicle-related theft was at its peak. Signs that vehicle-related theft was
abating in the way we suggest below were largely unrecognised, while the
possibility that it was about to decline was unthinkable. Even by 1999,
Home Office researchers were predicting a sharp rise in property crime
(Dhiri et al. 1999). With the benefit of hindsight, however, there were
clear signs that improved security was already significantly affecting vehicle
crime and that it had the potential to do so more extensively. A young
offender interviewed in one of the Home Office studies observed that,
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while some vehicle models were easy to steal, others were not, because
they had better quality locks:
I just look for cars that are easy to nick – cars that aren’t alarmed, general stuff
like Fords and MGs and Austins that are easy to get into. Nissans, Toyotas – mainly
Japanese makes like Subaru are really hard to get into because they’ve got awkward locks.
(young offender, quoted in Light, Nee and Ingham (1993, pp.48–9), italics added)
Light, Nee and Ingham (1993) suggest unfamiliarity with Japanese cars
perhaps made their locks appear more awkward, but the same study also
found that half of offenders reported they would be deterred by a vehicle
alarm. At the time of writing in 2015, car alarms are not viewed as having a
particularly strong preventive mechanism and their effectiveness is rather
modest (Farrell, Tseloni and Tilley 2011b). But in the 1980s and early
1990s they were more of an unknown quantity, and the fact that half of
teenage car thieves would be deterred suggests that adolescent offenders
were highly susceptible to even modest security efforts.
Quantifiable evidence of the effectiveness of the vehicle ‘high security’
noted by Home Office Minister Shaw in the 1980s is provided in the
first main report of the Home Office Car Theft Index (Houghton 1992).
The report notes that manufacturers were known to have made security
improvements to some popular models, and they were invited ‘to provide
details of those specific ranges for which security had been improved and
the extent of the security improvements’ (p.12). The details were used
to assess the impact of that security on theft risks for those models. Two
comparison groups were used to estimate reductions in thefts byHoughton
(1992). The most conservative of the estimates is a reduction in theft of
65–70% for the Ford Escort Mark 3, 64–69% for the Vauxhall Cavalier
Marks 2 and 3, 38–48% for the Ford Fiesta Marks 2 and 3, and 37.5% for
the Vauxhall Carlton (see Figure 1).1
The selection of vehicle models for high security was not random. Two
factors were critical. The first was their high theft rate compared with
other vehicle models. The second was their prevalence: the four mod-
els in Figure 1 include the first, third and fourth most popular vehicle
models on the road at the time (Houghton 1992). Moreover, the dis-
tribution of vehicle ownership was extremely skewed, such that: ‘Over
20% of the cars on the road in England and Wales are drawn from the
top five ranges’ (Houghton 1992, p.14). The most popular model, the
Ford Escort Mark 3 (on the left of Figure 1), with a population of over
1.5 million, had more than 50%more vehicles on the road than the second
most popular model.
Implicit recognition of the impact of improved vehicle security of the
1980s is further evident in the fact that the Car Theft Index identified
older cars to be more at risk, consistent with newer vehicles having better
security. Light, Nee and Ingham (1993) summed it up thus:
Ford and Vauxhalls dominate the high and medium risk groups, while the likeliest
cars to be stolen come from a small category of usually older models – Capris, Cortinas,
Escorts, Fiestas, Metros and Astras. (p.47, italics added)
5
C© 2016 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Howard Journal Vol 00 No 0. xxxx 2016
ISSN 2059-1101, pp. 1–12
FIGURE 1
Effect of Improved Security on High-risk Popular Vehicle Models
(Source: based on Houghton 1992.)
There is some evidence that, other things including security being equal,
older vehicles are at greater risk anyway.One explanation is that themarket
for second-hand parts experiences increased demand when models cease
production: there are still many of these vehicles on the road and so it spurs
theft for the parts. Biles (1974) found that one-year-old vehicles accounted
for 5.4% of thefts, with the proportion of thefts peaking among eight-year-
old vehicles, which accounted for 10.6% of thefts. Brown (1995) found
that one-year-old heavy goods vehicles (not subject to improved security)
had a theft rate of one per 1,000 registered, rising to seven per 1,000 for
nine-year-olds. This issue is important for present purposes because it also
suggests that ‘new’ security may experience a second wind of impact later
in the life of those vehicles. If this is so, then the impact of security would
continue to increase later in excess of its coverage of the vehicle fleet.
An aside is warranted here to note parallel developments in vehicle
security in the United States. They are relevant because they provide
independent supporting evidence of the 1980s’ implementation and ef-
fectiveness of new vehicle devices. The 1992 Report to Congress of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) highlights the
effectiveness of certain anti-theft devices in the 1980s. The report notes
that a ‘dramatic success story in theft reduction via antitheft systems is that
involving the Pontiac Firebird and the Chevrolet Camaro’ (National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration 1992, p.19). These were two of the more
popular and higher-risk models – the United States equivalent of those
above. The report details ‘a 67 percent and 65 percent decrease [in theft]
for the Firebird and Camaro, respectively’ (p.21), which are very similar
outcomes. While further research is required, the parallels suggest that the
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present study may shed new light on the relationship between vehicle theft
and improved security in the United States.2
Impact on Vehicle-related Theft Trends
So far we have established that from the mid-1980s, improved vehicle
security:
1. existed and was being introduced by manufacturers;
2. was highly effective;
3. was not implemented universally;
4. was targeted on high-risk vehicles;
5. would have more impact as vehicles aged.
It is important to have established that improved vehicle security had
already been introduced – not just developed – much earlier than previ-
ously suggested in crime-drop research. Farrell, Tilley and Tseloni (2014)
for example, extrapolated from limited Crime Survey for England and
Wales (CSEW, formerly the British Crime Survey) data to infer that elec-
tronic immobilisers began to be fitted in new vehicles from around 1993
when car theft appeared to begin its decline. That suggestion must now be
revised.
Two aspects of the way in which car theft was reduced are particularly
noteworthy. The first is the phenomenal effectiveness of the improved vehi-
cle security. The second is the targeting of high-risk vehicles. It means that
the impact upon theft rates would be disproportionate to the coverage of
new security in the vehicle fleet. It is well known that crime is extremely
concentrated upon a small proportion of targets. Sallybanks and Brown
(1999), for instance, showed that 38 high-risk models accounted for less
than 1% of models examined but 19% of cars stolen. Security focused on
the highest-risk models would impact disproportionately.
The effect upon the national crime rate would be small at first since
newly produced high-risk models with effective security would comprise
only a small part of the vehicle fleet. With the vehicle crime rate rising
quickly at the national level, it would take some time for it to begin to slow
that rate of increase. As improved security was installed in a greater pro-
portion of the vehicle fleet, the theft rate would plateau and only gradually
begin to decline. Only later would the rate of decline accelerate when a tip-
ping point was reached by sufficient coverage of high security among the
vehicle fleet that it became inefficient for would-be thieves to find suitable
targets. The additional age-effect identified above, when vehicles failed to
become vulnerable to theft for second-hand parts markets, would later add
to the rate of decline.
Theft from vehicles would be affected more quickly if improved door locks
spread more quickly than vehicle immobilisers: improved door locks are
more effective against theft from vehicles than theft of vehicles (Farrell,
Tseloni and Tilley 2011b). Theft from vehicles would also fall off faster if
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FIGURE 2
Motor Vehicle-related Theft
(Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales.)
FIGURE 3
Indexed Trends in Motor Vehicle-related Theft
(Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales.)
committed by offenders of a younger average age, that is, the novices who
are more easily deterred.
Theft from vehicles comprised the bulk of vehicle-related theft in
England and Wales (Figure 2) although the trend in theft of vehicles is
similar (Figure 3). The rate of increase of both types of vehicle-related theft
slows down well before the peak for each crime type. It slows down from
1987 for theft from vehicles and from 1991 for theft of vehicles. This trend
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FIGURE 4
Annual Percentage Difference in Vehicle-related Theft Rates
(Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales.)
component is visually clearest when shown as a change in the first differ-
ences (Figure 4). The first difference is the percentage change in the rate
from one year to the next.3
The rate of theft from vehicles decelerated from 1987 and underwent
gradual change over the course of the next decade. The trajectory of
change of theft of vehicles also occurs gradually with its increase deceler-
ating from 1991 to the 1993 peak, followed by a gradual decline to 1995
before a more rapid decline. The trend has four main components: a
slowing of the rate of increase in the crime rate; a plateau and/or peak; a
gradual crime rate decrease; and, acceleration of the crime rate decline.
The first differences (Figure 4) highlight the importance of change
that occurred before the crime rate peaked. This deceleration of the
rate of increase has been largely overlooked in previous studies. Having
missed this first stage it then becomes easier to overlook the fact that, for
vehicle-related theft at least, the first post-peak years were experienced as
a gradual decline.
Discussion and Conclusion
The present study complements existing security hypothesis research on
vehicle theft. It finds that, following three decades of exponential increase
from the 1950s, the rate of increase of vehicle-related theft in England
and Wales slowed when improved vehicle security was introduced from
the mid-1980s. The proportion of vehicles with security was small at first
and security’s effect was largely swamped by the continuing increases in
theft of other vehicles. It went largely unnoticed at the time. It is now clear
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that the crime rate gradually arced over the course of the next decade as
improved security on new vehicles spread through the vehicle fleet.
The dramatic effectiveness of improved security measures upon theft
rates of the most stolen and popular vehicle models was shown using evi-
dence from the first report of theHomeOffice Car Theft Index (Houghton
1992). Confirmatory testimony was provided by parallel developments in
the United States. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that contem-
porary interviews with offenders, conducted before vehicle crime peaked,
showed vehicle high security, and perceptions of improved security, to have
great potential to reduce crime. For high security to be fitted in vehicles
in the mid-1980s it was almost certainly being developed in the 1970s and
therefore linked to pressure on manufacturers from that time. This was
likely induced by momentum from the agreement between the Home Of-
fice and the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders to fit steering
column locks to all new vehicles from 1971, plus continued Home Office
interest (for example, Mayhew et al. 1976; Ekblom 1979).
Further research should examine the specifics of which manufacturers
did, what, where, and when. It should examine the specifics of individual
security measures. It is to be hoped that manufacturers or the insurance
industry’s Thatcham Research Centre retain the relevant records.4 Pre-
liminary evidence was offered that the Home Office played a key role in
promoting security development. In the United States it appears that 1984
legislation further incentivised manufacturers (see Brown 2013, p.12).
The two main conclusions of the present study are that:
(i) what became the ‘drop’ in vehicle-related theft began earlier than typ-
ically understood;
(ii) the gradual change in the rate over a decade is consistent with new
vehicle security gradually permeating the vehicle fleet.
The implication of the present study for crime-drop research is that some
reconceptualisation may be required. The search for something sudden
that occurred simultaneously for all crime types should be reconsidered in
favour of investigating the gradual permeation of the effects of more and
improved security devices.
Notes
1 The comparison here uses what was referred to as ‘drop expected for average car’
(Houghton 1992, p.21, Figure 4) which appears to be the more sophisticated compar-
ison group than the ‘no extra security’ group. For the present study, it was necessary
to generate the numeric estimates by eyeballing Houghton’s Figure 4, and so the
estimates and ranges can be taken as broadly correct.
2 Specifically, our interpretation is that Fujita and Maxfield (2012) find that the uptake
of vehicle immobilisers appears rather slow relative to the decline in vehicle theft. We
suspect that this is explained by: (i) the tremendous effectiveness of the new security;
(ii) the fact that it was targeted at the highest-risk vehicles; and (iii) that these were
often the most popular vehicles on the road.
3 It is calculated as an annual difference by halving the difference when there were two
years between CSEW sweeps, and quartering it when there were four years between
sweeps.
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4 The Thatcham Research Centre was established in 1969 to reduce the cost of motor
vehicle insurance claims, and undertakes a range of security-related research (see
http://www.thatcham.org (accessed 10 December 2015)).
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